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Chopko: NRDC v. Evans: Northern District of California Delivers Sound Jud

NRDC V EVANS: NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DELIVERS "SOUND" JUDGMENT IN PROTECTION OF
MARINE WILDLIFE UNDER THE MMPA, RESTRICTING
NAVY'S USE OF SONAR
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Department of the Navy's (Navy) Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) Low Frequency Active Sonar (LFA) is a new form of sonar, designed to aid in the
development and testing of new naval warfare technologies.' The
mission of SURTASS LFA is to detect increasingly quiet enemy submarines in a timely manner.2 In carrying out this mission, the new
technology sends out intense sonar pulses at low frequencies that
3
travel hundreds of miles.
Despite the anticipated success of LFA sonar in enhancing
national security, many environmentalists claim that this low frequency sonar will have devastating effects on marine wildlife species. 4 Specifically, environmentalists are concerned about the long1. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (N.D.
Cal. 2003). See also, Paul C. Kiamos, National Security and Wildlife Protection: Maintaining an Effective Balance, 8 ENVTL. LAw 457, 486 (June 2002) (noting that both
Russian and French navies already employ LFA sonar system); Department of the
Navy SURTASS LFA Systems Description, at http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/Description/index.htm (explaining purpose and operation of SURTASS LFA) [hereinafter SURTASS LFA Website].
2. See generally SURTASS LFA Website, supra note 1. For further discussion of
SURTASS LFA see infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
3. Id. (discussing history and unsecured operational details of SURTASS LFA
sonar).
4. See generally Elena M. McCarthy, InternationalRegulation of TransboundaryPollutants: The Emerging Challenge of Ocean Noise, 6 OcEAN & CoASTAL L.J. 257 (2001)
(discussing impacts of ocean noise on health of marine mammals and attempts to
regulate noise). Marine mammals are "insonified" when exposed to underwater
sonar because underwater noise creates interference with the animals' "ecolocating sonars" which they rely on to communicate and navigate. Id. at 269. Powerful
sound may "cause tissue in the lungs, ears, or other body parts to rupture or hemorrhage." Id. at 269-70. Furthermore, "[m]ammals' reaction to sound can range
from brief interruptions of normal activities, such as feeding, to short- or long-term
displacement from noisy areas." Id. at 270. See also Margot Higgins, Alarm Sounds
Over U.S. Navy Sonar Program,ENVIRONMENTAL NEws NETWORK, (Apr. 6, 2001) avail-

able at http://www.enn.com.extras/printer-friendly.asp?storyid=42879 (highlighting claims of environmental groups that Navy failed to address affects of sonar
system on long-term health and behavior of whales, dolphins and hundreds of
other marine species); Kenneth Weiss, U.S. Navy's Sonar is Danger to Sea Life, Judge
Rules, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/
2003/08/27/1061663853625.html (noting findings of scientists who discovered in-
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term effects of LFA sonar on the health and behavior of whales,
dolphins and hundreds of other marine species. 5 Marine mammals
depend on their sensitive hearing for needs such as following migratory routes, locating each other over distances, finding food and
caring for their young. 6 Loud noises, particularly those lasting in
duration, interfere with the animals' hearing, which in turn threat7
ens their ability to function and survive.
Maintaining national security is of particular importance today,
especially given the need for increased vigilance following the
tragic events of September 11, 2001.8 Military preparedness, including protection against enemy submarine attacks, is an essential
element of maintaining a comprehensive national security system. 9
There is no doubt, however, that protecting the world's ocean and
sea creatures, dependent on the ocean environment for survival, is
of equally great importance.1 0 To prevent harm to military readiness and to ensure that military training complies with substantive

tense sound can tear delicate air-filled tissues around mammals' brains and ears,
resulting in hemorrhaging and death); Natural Resources Defense Council, Navy
Sonar System Threatens Whales, NRDC Website, (Sept. 25, 2003) available at http://
www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/nlfa.asp (comparing noise generated by Navy's
new sonar technology to sound level of "Times Square at rush hour.") [hereinafter
NRDC Website].
5. See NRDC Website, supra note 4 (asserting inadequacy of Navy's environmental impact statement and failure to address long-term effects of LFA sonar on
marine mammals).
6. Id. (explaining marine mammals' reliance upon hearing).
7. Id. (explaining effect of noise on marine mammals); see also McCarthy,
supra note 4 at 269-70 (explaining effect of noise on marine mammals).
8. See Dan Meyer and Everett E. Volk, "W"for War and Wedge? Environmental
Enforcement and the Sacrifice of American Security - National and Environmental- To
Complete the Emergence of a New "Beltway" GoverningElite, 25 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 41
(2003) (discussing national security measures and consequential impact on environment). The authors address concerns regarding potential expansion of military operations and its impact on the environment. Specifically, the authors note
the statement of Vice Adm. James Amerault, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in
a March 2003 Senate hearing:
While our naval forces may have decreased in number, our requirement
for ranges have not. Today's higher performance aircraft and ships employ weapons of greater capability, but also of greater complexity and
unique delivery tactics. The combination of capability, complexity and
tactics also translates into the need for larger ranges.
Id. at 54; see generally, Paul C. Kiamos, supra note 1.
9. Meyer, supra note 8 at 42-48 (discussing national defense preparedness in
light of existing environmental legislation).
10. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138-39 (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (discussing need to balance concerns of Navy and environmental
groups).
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requirements of environmental legislation, a careful balance must
be maintained.1 1
This Note examines the Northern District of California's review of the Navy's SURTASS LFA program and its compliance with
environmental laws employed to protect marine wildlife in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Evans.12 In particular, the court in Evans
examined the program's compliance with the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 13 Section II of this Note
presents the facts of Evans.14 Section III of this Note examines the
applicability and effects of the Navy's implementation and use of
new low frequency sonar on the environment, especially marine
15
mammal wildlife, in light of existing environmental legislation.
Section IV discusses the Northern District of California's rationale
for issuing an injunction, restricting the Navy's peacetime use of
the low frequency sonar in Evans.16 Section V analyzes the Northern District of California's decision in light of existing precedent,
and offers possible solutions to better maintain an adequate balance between national defense concerns and environmental protection concerns.' 7 Finally, Section VI concludes with an assessment
of the impact the District Court's decision will have on the balance
between protecting marine wildlife and maintaining national security.' 8
II.

FACTS

In late 2002, plaintiffs, various environmental groups (Natural
Resources Defense Council or NRDC), 19 sought a permanent in11. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 461-62 (acknowledging importance of maintaining balance between environmental protection and Navy training).
12. See generally, Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (reviewing Navy's use of
SURTASS LFA sonar and compliance with environmental laws).
13. See id. at 1141-88 (discussing impact of environmental legislation on Navy
training).
14. For a discussion of the facts of Evans, see infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the applicability and effects of Navy training on the
environment in light of existing environmental legislation, see infra notes 154-57
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the court's analysis in Evans, see infra notes 87-125 and
accompanying text.
17. For a critical analysis of the district court's decision, see infra notes 126-50
and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact of the district court's decision, see infra
notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
19. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. Included amongst the plaintiffs in Evans
was also "a concerned individual." Id.
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junction against federal officials to prevent the United States Navy's
peacetime use of a low frequency sonar system, LFA, for training,
testing and routine operations. 20 NRDC charged that the Navy's
unrestricted use of the new sonar would result in irreparable injury
by harassing, injuring and killing marine mammals and other sea
creatures with sensitive hearing. 2 1 NRDC further noted that many
of the animals affected by the Navy's use of LFA are already endan22
gered, including whales, dolphins, seals, turtles and salmon.
NRDC raised two main issues. 23 First, it claimed that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) improperly approved the
Navy's use of the new sonar in as much as seventy-five percent of
the world's oceans in violation of the MMPA, the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).24 Second, NRDC claimed that
the Navy issued an inadequate Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS), which violated the NEPA. 2 5 In response, the Navy argued
that it had fully complied with all applicable laws. 26 The Navy fur-

ther argued that enjoining the peacetime use of LFA sonar would
harm national security because training and testing is necessary for
27
military readiness.
The court granted NRDC's motion for a preliminary injunction on October 31, 2002.28 Both parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on April 15, 2003.29 On June 30, 2003, the
30
court heard the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

20. See id. at 1137-38 (discussing procedural history of case).
21. See id. For further discussion of the plaintiff's claims regarding irreparable injury to marine mammals, see infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
22. See id. at 1139. The district court observed that "the populations of many
of these creatures, once abundant, have shrunk, and some are on the verge of
extinction." Id.
23. For a discussion of the two issues raised by NRDC, see infra notes 24-25
and accompanying text.
24. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1140-41. NMFS and the Navy have an armslength regulatory relationship for the purpose of ensuring enforcement and compliance with federal environmental laws. See id. Together, the two agencies prepared the "Final Rule," as required by federal law, to ensure compliance with
environmental legislation during military operations. Id.
25. See id. at 1164-75 (addressing NRDC's complaint that Navy violated NEPA
based on inadequate environmental impact statement).
26. Id. at 1138 (noting defenses to NRDC's allegations that Navy violated various environmental laws).
27. Id. (discussing Navy's defense to plaintiffs' alleged environmental legislation violations).
28. Id. (discussing request for preliminary injunction).
29. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (discussing requests for summary
judgment).
30. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see infra notes 87-125 and accompanying text.
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III.

A.

BACKGROUND

SURTASS LFA

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) is an essential component of
the Navy's defense mission.3 1 The Navy began developing SURTASS LFA in 1985 to supplement the ASW mission and enable the
United States to better detect a new generation of quieter Soviet
32
submarines.
The SURTASS portion of the system is a low frequency passive
surveillance system that is deployed on surface ships and is capable
of collecting and analyzing acoustic data.33 The LFA portion of the
system consists of a series of acoustic transmitters placed on a cable

below a surface ship.3 4 The LFA functions by using transmitters to
send out "pings" which bounce off underwater objects and then
echo back to the operator. 35 The system's operation has been described as having the ability to "light up" enemy submarines with
acoustics, similar to the way a floodlight can illuminate an intruder
36
in a dark backyard.
Since the Navy first began sea trials for SURTASS LFA in the
1990s, the military threat has shifted to new concerns regarding the
growing submarine fleets of "non-allied" nations such as the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, Iran and North
Korea.3 7 The Navy reports that there are currently two hundred
and twenty-four submarines operated by these "non-allied" nations,
31. See SURTASS LFA Website, supra note I (explaining purpose and operation of SURTASS LFA).
32. See generally Teresa B. Salamone and James L. Noles, Jr., Judge Enjoins Testing of Naval Surveillance Technology, 18 NAT. REsoURCES & ENV'T 31 (2003) (discussing background development of SURTASS LFA). The reported cost of the
program was "more than $300 million." Id. at 31.
33. See SURTASS LFA Website, supra note 1 (explaining unclassified purpose
and operation of SURTASS LFA).
34. See id. (explaining that LFA system is used when target is "too quiet to be
detected by passive SURTASS system alone.").
35. See id. (comparing underwater sound pulse or "ping" to manner of stereo
speakers turning electrical impulses into sound waves in air).
36. Weiss, supra note 4 (describing far-reaching capabilities of SURTASS LFA

sonar).
37. See Salamone, supra note 32, at 57 (discussing military preparedness concerns). See also Robert McClure, Tests on Marine Mammals to Look for Sonar Link to
Injuries, SEA-I-rLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (July 12, 2003), available at http://seattlepi.
nwsource.com/local/130609_sonarl 2.html. The author quotes Rear Adm. Robert
Moeller in congressional testimony regarding use of new sonar: "[n]ew ultra-quiet
diesel-electric submarines armed with deadly torpedoes and cruise missiles are proliferating widely." Id.
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many of which are "quieter and more deadly than ever before."38
According to the Navy, undetected submarines are equivalent to an
underwater terrorist and have the ability to threaten not only sur39
face ships, but America's shores as well.

Recognizing the need to comply with existing environmental
legislation, the Navy has spent over sixteen million dollars conducting scientific research regarding the sonar system's effect on
the environment. 40 As a result of such extensive research, the Navy
established an independent scientific working group, responsible
for recommending research priorities. 4 1 In addition, the Navy reports that it conducted quantitative modeling of animal movements
and acoustical exposure, as well as the employment of on-going
monitoring and mitigation programs, to minimize the risk of harm
42
to marine mammals from the new sonar.
B.

Marine Mammal Protection Act

Congress enacted the MMPA in 1972 to "promote conservation
of ocean-dwelling mammals. '4 3 The MMPA prohibits the taking of
44
marine mammals with certain statutory exceptions.
The term "take" is defined broadly under the MMPA to mean
"harass, hunt, capture, or kill," or attempt to do any of the preceding acts. 4 5 Negligently operating an aircraft or a vessel is also an

46
activity encompassed by the MMPA's "take" definition.
The term "harassment" under the MMPA means "any act of
pursuit, torment, or annoyance" that "has the potential to injure a
marine mammal," or that "has the potential to disturb a marine

38. See SURTASS LFA Website, supra note 1 (explaining need to detect new
submarines at long-range to ensure adequate reaction time).
39. See id. (explaining that only low frequency active sonar provides longrange submarine detection capability that Navy needs). The Website explains that
"[t] he Navy Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINCs) have determined that SURTASS
LFA sonar is a crucial element of the Navy's anti-submarine warfare force and is an
asset required for our national security." Id.
40. See id. (noting that Navy developed Environmental Impact Statement in
addition to "state-of-the-art marine mammal mitigation system."); see generally Margaret M. Carlson, Environmental Diplomacy: Analyzing Why the U.S. Navy Still Falls
Short Overseas, 47 NAVAL L. REv. 62 (2000) (discussing military's requirements and
attempts to comply with environmental protection laws).
41. See SURTASS LFA Website, supra note 1 (noting establishment of independent scientific working group).
42. See id. (explaining additional steps Navy is taking to protect marine life).
43. Kiamos, supra note 1, at 462-63 (explaining overview of MMPA).
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000) (listing exceptions for takings).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (2000) (defining term "take").
46. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 464 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (2001)).
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mammal" by disrupting its behavioral patterns. 47 Harassment that
has the potential to injure a marine mammal is level "A" harassment.48

Harassment that will merely disturb a marine mammal by

disrupting behavioral patterns is level "B" harassment. 49 The distinction between level "A" and "B" harassment is material because it
50
indicates the type of authorization required for incidental takings.
Several categories of activities are excluded from application of
the MMPA.5 1 For example, the MMPA allows American Indians,
Aleuts and Eskimos to take marine mammals for subsistence purposes or to make or sell native craft articles. 52 In addition, the
MMPA permits the taking of a marine mammal as a means of selfdefense.5 3 Finally, the MMPA provides an exception for situations
where it is imminently necessary to deter a marine mammal from
54
damaging fishing gear or catch.

The Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior may waive the
restriction on takings under the MMPA if, on the basis of scientific
evidence, they determine that the taking will be consistent with
principles of resource protection and conservation. 55 The Secretaries, however, rarely use this waiver provision and cannot use it if it
will result in the taking of affected species which are below "opti56
mum sustainable population levels."
The MMPA authorizes the Secretary to allow for "incidental
takes" where proposed activities may result in the unintentional taking of small numbers of marine mammals. 57 To approve an "inci47. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(18) (A) (2000); see also 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (2001) (dividing
harassment into two levels). "Level A harassment" means an act of pursuit, torment or annoyance having the potential to injure a marine mammal. Id. "Level B
harassment" means an act of pursuit, torment or annoyance, which has the potential to disturb a marine mammal in the wild by causing disruption of behavioral
patterns. Id.
48. Kiamos, supranote 1, at 465 (explaining distinctions between Level A harassment and Level B harassment).
49. Id. (describing "Level B" harassment).
50. See id. (explaining that types of authorizations required for incidental takings are different for Level A and Level B harassment).
51. Id. at 466 (discussing various activities to which MMPA taking provisions
do not apply).

52. See id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2000)).
53. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 466 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (2000) (providing for self-defense exception)).

54. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (4) (A) (2000)).
55. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (3) (A) (2000)).
56. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (3) (B) (2000)) (discussing infrequent use
of waiver provision).
57. Id. at 467-70 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (5) (A) (2000)) (discussing "incidental take" provision)).
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dental take," the Secretary must conclude that there will be a
"negligible impact" on the affected species.5 8 In planning and implementing training exercises, determining whether an agency is
allowed to "take" is subject to an arbitrary and capricious review
59
standard under the APA.
Although the MMPA does not provide for automatic exemptions for national security matters, Naval training exercises may be
exempt from complying with MMPA regulations under a "necessity
defense" when circumstances make it impossible for the Navy to
comply with the law. 60 To successfully assert a "necessity defense"

under the MMPA, a crisis must exist where a commander is forced
to choose between violating the MMPA (potentially harming or taking a marine mammal) and taking no action (producing a greater
harm to national security).61
C. Judicial Interpretation of the MMPA
1.

Strahan v. Linnon

Several courts have considered the application of the MMPA to
federal agency actions and have held that a permit is required if the
agency's actions may result in the taking of a marine mammal. 62 In
Strahan v. Linnon, the court held that the U.S. Coast Guard was required to apply for a small take permit if it anticipated taking a
marine mammal during the course of its operations. 63 In Strahan,
plaintiffs filed citizen suits alleging that the Coast Guard failed to
comply with NEPA, the ESA and the MMPA after evidence showed
58. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 467-70 (discussing standards for "incidental
takes").
59. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000) (noting standard of review).
60. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 479 (discussing incidental harassment
authorizations).
61. See id. (explaining instances where Naval training exercises may potentially be excused from MMPA compliance). See also John Alan Cohan, Modes of
Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental Protection Under the InternationalLaw
of War, 15 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 481, 482-85 (2003) (discussing military operations and
effect on environment). The U.S. Navy Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations addresses the protection of the environment during times of
conflict. Id. at 534. "Itis not unlawful to cause collateral damage to the natural
environment during an attack upon a legitimate military objective. However, the
commander has an affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the extent that it is practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment." Id. at 534-35.
62. See Kaimos, supra note 1, at 473-78 (reviewing judicial interpretation of
MMPA application to federal agency actions).
63. See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 627 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding
agency required to obtain small take permit for potential takes during procedural
operations).
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that the Coast Guard had struck and killed two Northern Right
whales with a watercraft. 64 The Coast Guard had not prepared any
form of environmental compliance documentation for operations
65
in the area where the whales were struck and killed.
The court noted that the Coast Guard failed to apply for a
MMPA permit. 66 Consequently, the court issued a preliminary in-

junction, ordering the Coast Guard to apply for a permit "for all
Coast Guard operations that may accidentally 'take' a Northern
Right whale regardless of whether defendants consider the possible
67

taking unlikely."

2.

United States v. Hayashi

Courts have generally interpreted the MMPA's "harassment"
criteria to require more than a temporary, non-injurious alteration
of marine mammal behavior. 68 For example, in United States v.
Hayashi,a fisherman was charged with violating the MMPA when he
fired shots near porpoises to distract them from eating bait on his
fishing line. 69 Initially, the fisherman was convicted of knowingly

taking a marine mammal because he had harassed or attempted to
70
harass the porpoises by shooting near them.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the fisherman's conviction, however, holding that "reasonable actions . . . not resulting in severe,
sustained disruption of the mammal's normal routine ... [of] eat-

ing fish or bait off a fishing line are not rendered criminal by the
MMPA or its regulations. 7 1 Because the fisherman's actions did
not amount to a substantial disruption of the mammal's routine,
the court determined that his acts did not qualify as harassment
72
under the MMPA.
64. Id. at 610 (noting that Right whales are most endangered species of large
whales). Evidence of the killing of the two whales was undisputed. Id. at 611-12.
65. Id. at 612 (discussing failure of Coast Guard to have completed small take

application).
66. Id. at 632 (discussing rigid standard of MMPA requirements).
67. Id. (issuing preliminary injunction requiring Coast Guard to apply for
permit).

68. For a discussion of courts' interpretation of MMPA's "harassment" criteria, see infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
69. See United States v. Hayashi, 5 F.3d 1278, 1279 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding

no violation of MMPA because there was no sustained disruption of marine mammals' routine).
70. Id. (discussing findings of lower court).
71. Id. at 1284 (reversing lower court's opinion and concluding that insufficient evidence supported defendant's position).
72. Id. (demonstrating limitations of MMPA).
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Tepley v. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration

Another case where "harassment" under the MMPA was at issue involved charges against an underwater photographer in Tepley
v. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration.73 In Tepley, a photographer and his friend approached a group of whales while traveling in their boat.7 4 As the animals meandered around the boat,
the photographer's friend entered the water to touch the whales. 75
One of the whales suddenly grabbed the friend and pulled her underwater while the photographer captured the incident on his
video recorder. 76 Upon learning of the incident, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) filed charges
against both individuals, asserting that they had harassed the whales
77
and annoyed them with the sound of the video camera.
The court in Tepley applied the standard established by the
Ninth Circuit in Hayashi: "harassment" under the MMPA had to involve a direct, serious disruption of a marine mammal's customary
habits. 78 The court determined that there was no evidence to support the assertion that the boat caused erratic behavior in the mammals in any way. 79 Furthermore, the court pointed out that merely
chasing the whales, but not causing them to flee, did not constitute
harassment. 80 Finally, the court held that even if the camera made
some noise, such slight noise alone would not be sufficient to con81
stitute harassment under the MMPA, as defined in Hayashi.
D.

Agency Interpretation of the MMPA

In addition to judicial interpretation of the MMPA, the NMFS
has issued several statements indicating its supervisory control over
harassment of marine mammals.8 2 Such supervisory control is evi73. See Tepley v. Nat'l. Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 908 F. Supp. 708
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to find "taking" by "harassment" where photographer
recorded video of whale dragging friend underwater).
74. Id. at 709 (discussing facts of case and explaining incident began when
photographer's friend began gently touching whale).
75. Id. (discussing facts of case).
76. Id. (noting video recordings captured by photographer were later broadcast on national television).
77. Id. (discussing allegations raised by NOAA and noting defendant was not
charged with injuring whale in any way).
78. Tepley, 908 F. Supp. at 710 (citing United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859, 864
(9th Cir. 1993)).
79. Id. at 711 (concluding that there was no "substantial disruption").
80. Id. at 712 (interpreting "harassment" under MMPA).
81. Id. (discussing degree of "harassment" required to show MMPA violation).
82. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 478 (noting applicability to and close scrutiny
of military training).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss2/3

10

2004]

Chopko: NRDC v. Evans:"SOUND"
Northern District
of California Delivers Sound Jud
JUDGMENT

denced by the NMFS's incidental harassment authorizations. 8 3 For
example, the NMFS provided incidental harassment authorizations
for missiles launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base because the
launches may have resulted in a temporary reduction in the number of seals on the beach. 84 In addition, the NMFS authorized the
noise from helicopters flying over ice in Alaska under the MMPA
because the noise affected seals.8 5 Finally, the NMFS has allowed
for incidental harassment to occur where marine mammals in the
vicinity of a seismic source reacted to the sounds generated or the
86
visual cues.
IV.

NARRATrVE ANALYSIS

In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans, the Northern District of California issued an injunction limiting the Navy's use of low
frequency sonar in an attempt to protect both military preparedness and marine wildlife. 87 In its analysis, the court focused on several prominent environmental legislative acts, including the
MMPA. 88

A.

MMPA Analysis

The court in Evans determined that the Navy's.plans to employ
the new sonar did not comport with the MMPA in respect to several
key elements of the statute.8 9 In its analysis, the court considered
five alleged violations of the MMPA resulting from an inadequate
83. Id. (noting supervisory control regarding incidental take authorizations).
84. Id. (citing Small Takes of Marine Mammals Incidental to Specified Activities;
Lockheed Launch Vehicles at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Ca., 62 Fed. Reg. 26,779,
26,779-80 (May 15, 1997)).
85. Id. (citing Small Takes of Marine Mammals Incidental to Specified Activities; Oil
and Gas Exploration DrillingActivities in the Beaufort Sea, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,881, 37,883
(July 15, 1997)).
86. Id. at 479 (citing Small Takes of MarineMammals Incidental to Specified Activities; Offshore Seismic Activities in the Beaufort Sea, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,553, 19,554 (Apr. 22,
1997)).
87. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (granting in part and denying in part both parties motions for summary
judgment). The order did not preclude the Navy from using the low frequency
sonar during wartime, and acknowledged that the Navy must be allowed to train
with it beforehand in various oceanic conditions and under prescribed circumstances. Id. at 1139.
88. For a discussion of the court's MMPA analysis, see infra notes 89-125 and
accompanying text.
89. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1141-64 (N.D.
Cal 2003) (discussing Navy's compliance with MMPA requirements).
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Final Rule for the implementation of the LFA sonar issued by
NMFS. 90

1.

Specified GeographicalRegion

The court determined that in order to comply with the MMPA,
the Final Rule "must authorize the Navy to operate in only a limited
number of geographical regions at any given time." 9' NRDC alleged that the biomes and provinces identified by NMFS were too
large. 92 Specifically, they asserted that such a vast area would be
inappropriate as a specified geographic region and, as such, vio93
lated the MMPA.
The Navy argued that, under the MMPA, there is no requirement that the specified regions be small, as long as the regions are
not any larger than necessary "to accomplish the specified activity." 94 Moreover, the Navy argued that large areas were needed for
an LFA sonar mission to remain within one, or at most two, speci95
fied geographic regions.
The court concluded that even though the SURTASS LFA system called for a large geographic area in order to operate, it was
particularly troublesome that the geographical regions chosen by
NMFS and the Navy "undisputedly did not have homogeneous ecological or biogeographical characteristics." 96 According to the
court, the Final Rule was erroneous because it did not preclude the
Navy from applying to proceed in all fifty-four provinces in a given
90. For a discussion of the district court's analysis of the five alleged MMPA
violations, see infra notes 91-125 and accompanying text.
91. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-47 (concluding that Navy had failed to
indicate in Final Rule that it would limit operations to specified geographic location as required by MMPA).
92. Id. at 1142. The Navy's Final Rule authorized incidental takings by Level
A and Level B harassment of particular marine mammals in fifteen different biomes. Id.
93. Id. (noting plaintiffs reference to "specific geographical region" at 16
U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A)).
94. Id. at 1142-47 (discussing Navy's argument regarding specified geographic
locations).
95. Id. at 1144-45. The Navy contended that fairly large areas are needed to
operate LFA sonar within a geographic region. Id. The Navy pointed out that
because LFA sonar bounces from the ocean bottom to the surface and back again,
small geographic regions would be "functionally inappropriate." Id. See also
SURTASS LFA Website, supra note 1 (discussing operation of SURTASS LFA
sonar).
96. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1145-47 (noting that because Navy's Final Rule
contained no limit on how many provinces would be involved in any operation of
LFA sonar, no specific geographical limitations were established).
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year, nor did it preclude NMFS from authorizing the deployment of
97
LFA worldwide.
Even though the Navy had not indicated that it would ever attempt to operate in all fifty-four provinces, because it was currently
not capable of doing so, the court held that the Final Report was in
error because it failed to limit the take of marine mammals to a
"specified geographic region."9 8 Accordingly, the District Court
granted NRDC's motion for summary judgment regarding the
Navy's authorization to operate in only a limited number of geographical regions at any given time. 99
2. Small Numbers Provision
Next, the District Court held that NMFS violated the small
numbers provision of the MMPA because it used an erroneous definition of "small numbers" which did not comport with the Act. 100
The court explained that even though the defendants could reasonably interpret the meaning of "small numbers," they could not
ignore the statutory requirement for permits where a potential permittee must show that the taking will "[be] small and have a negligible impact on the affected species." 1° 1 According to the court, the
"small numbers" and the "negligible impact" requirements needed
10 2
to be defined so that each term had its own meaning.
3. The Final Rule's Definition of "Harassment"
NRDC next argued that the Navy's Final Rule used an illegal
definition of "harassment." 10 3 Specifically, NRDC pointed out that
the Final Rule used a different definition for "Level B harassment"
than that set forth in the statute. 10 4 According to NRDC, the Navy's
97. Id. (discussing potential impact of inadequate Final Rule).
98. Id. at 1147 (discussing compliance with specified geographic location criteria under MMPA).
99. Id. (granting NRDC's motion for summary judgment regarding extent of
geographical regions).
100. See generally id. at 1147-53 (discussing "small numbers" requirements
under MMPA).
101. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (holding that definition of "small numbers" allowing taking of up to 12% of species violates Congressional intent).
102. Id. at 1153 (concluding Navy's definition was erroneous because it combined two elements of test into single standard). Consequently, the court ruled
that the Navy's interpretation was "arbitrary and capricious" under the APA. Id.
103. See generally id. at 1153-58 (discussing Final Rule's definition of
"harassment").
104. Id. at 1153 (noting plaintiffs' claim). The Navy's Final Rule states: "For
Level B incidental harassment takings, NMFS will determine whether takings by
harassment are occurring based on whether there is a significant behavioral
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alleged alteration of "harassment" changed the statutory definition
in two key respects: (1) it required that there be an actual disruption of behavioral patterns and notjust a potential for disruption as
required by the statute; and (2) it required that the disruption be
significant, even though the statute contained no such limitation.1 0 5
After a careful analysis of the language of the MMPA, the court
determined that the Navy had complied with the statutory requirements in creating the Final Rule.10 6 The court first pointed out that
the Navy had considered potential harassment at length in formulating the Final Rule. 10 7 Even though NMFS may have used an erroneous definition of "harassment" under the MMPA in the Final
Rule, the court indicated that such an erroneous definition did not
10 8
appear to have caused any harm.
Next, the District Court determined that NMFS had not acted
outside of its scope of discretion by interpreting the statutory language "disruption" to require a significant change. 10 9 According to
the court, NMFS' interpretation of the statutory language "disruption of behavior patterns" could appropriately be paraphrased as "a
significant behavioral change in a biologically important behavior
activity." 110 It was apparent to the court that the two standards were

similar in meaning. 1 1 Accordingly, the court denied NRDC's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether NMFS applied

change in a biologically important activity, such as feeding, breeding, migration or
sheltering." Id. The Final Rule also provides: "Level B harassment taking occurs if
the marine mammal has a significant behavioral response in a biologically important behavior or activity." Id. (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 46,740).

105. Id. at 1154 (noting plaintiffs' major arguments against Navy's "harassment" definition in Final Rule).
106. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1154-58 (comparing Navy's and NRDC's argu-

ments regarding definitions of "potential to disturb," "significance requirement,"
and "impact on individual mammals").
107. Id. at 1157 (discussing impact on single animal versus impact on all animals standards) (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 46,780).

108. Id. at 1158 (noting proven lack of harm to animals from LFA). The Evans court noted that NMFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to abide by

Congress' express definition of harassment in the MMPA; however, the plaintiffs
had not shown any injury. Id.
109. Id. at 1155-56 (discussing discretion of NMFS to interpret terminology
used in Final Rule).
110. Id. (noting analogous meaning of "disruption of behavior patterns" and
"significant behavioral change in a biologically important behavior activity," despite different choice of words).
111. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-57 (noting no significant difference in
word meaning).
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the wrong standard for Level B harassment in preparing the Final
1 12

Rule.

4.

Negligible Impact

With regard to the "negligible impact" requirement under the
MMPA, NRDC argued that the Navy's plan to deploy LFA sonar in a
vast portion of the Pacific Ocean did not constitute a "merely negligible impact." 1 13 The Navy responded, however, that the "taking"
would be capped at a particular percentage, and that the likely impact would be far less because they would generally avoid operating
in coastal areas, where concentrations of marine mammals are
11 4
highest, and because they would employ mitigation measures.
The court agreed with NRDC and held that, without more restrictions on deployment of LFA sonar in sensitive areas and during
sensitive periods, there could be occasions where the impact on
particular populations is not "merely negligible."' 15 Therefore, the
court noted that enhancing the required mitigation measures was
1 16
necessary to ensure "negligible impact."
5.

Mitigation and Monitoring

Finally, the court addressed the monitoring and reporting requirement of "takes" under the MMPA. 117 Although in the Final
Rule NMFS proposed several measures designed to limit the harm
to marine mammals, the court ultimately concluded that these pro1 18
posals were insufficient under the requirements of the MMPA.
112. Id. at 1157 (denying plaintiffs summary judgment motion on issue of
appropriate "harassment" definition).
113. Id. at 1158-59 (discussing plaintiff's argument regarding negligible impact requirement under MMPA).
114. Id. at 1158 (discussing Navy's planned mitigation efforts); but see id. at
1158 (pointing out that at same time, Navy expressed need to continue to train in
coastal waters).
115. Id. at 1159 (pointing out that under Navy's Final Rule, harassment by
LFA sonar of up to 12% of very small populations could be detrimental).
116. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1159 (noting need to continue monitoring).
The Evans court also noted that if the annual take authorized by each year's LOA
is exceeded and is not limited to harassment but involves actual injury and death,
the negligible impact finding must be revisited. Id.
117. See id. at 1159-64 (explaining that Congress imposed stringent standard
regarding mitigation and monitoring); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (5) (A) (2000)
(stating that under mitigation and monitoring requirements of MMPA, agencies
must adopt measures to ensure "least practicable adverse impact" on marine
mammals).
118. See Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (listing Final Rule proposals). The
Final Rule proposals included: (1) a 2 kilometer (1.2 nautical miles) exclusion
zone around LFA source where operations would be shut down if marine mammals or sea turtles were detected; (2) excluding as "off limits" coastal areas within
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NRDC argued that the Navy's mitigation proposals were insufficient to achieve "the least practicable adverse impact," and that
NMFS "arbitrarily failed to adopt additional, more stringent measures."1 1 9 The Navy and NMFS contended, however, that the measures the Navy chose were within its discretion and other measures
120
would be unnecessary and impractical.
Although the court commended the Navy's attempts at establishing an "exclusion zone" to protect marine wildlife during LFA
deployment, it noted that realistic detection of all animals within
the exclusion zone would not be possible. 12 1 In addition, the court
explained that the Navy could employ alternatives, such as pre-operation visual surveys by helicopters or small crafts, to ensure the
taking of only small numbers of marine mammals. 122 Accordingly,
the court granted NRDC's motion for summary judgment regarding the adequacy of the Navy's mitigation and monitoring under
123
the MMPA.
The District Court attempted to reconcile the interests of both
parties by granting in part and denying in part each party's motions
for summary judgment. 124 The court issued an injunction that allowed the Navy to meet its needs for peacetime training and testing
125
while protecting marine mammals and other sea animals.
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Northern District of California's decision in Evans is consistent with existing precedent addressing the MMPA's application
to actions having the potential to interfere with marine mammals'
12 nautical miles of shoreline, and limiting received levels of LFA sonar to 145 dB
at known human dive sites; and (3) forbidding deployment of LFA sonar in the
Arctic or Antarctic. Id. at 1159.
119. See id. at 1159-60 (discussing limitations of Navy's proposed mitigation
measures).
120. See id. at 1160 (listing measures implemented to limit harm to marine

mammals).
121. See id. (explaining that visual monitoring of smaller animals would not
be effective, especially in rough seas or in dark and that passive sonar often overlooks quieter animals).
122. See id. at 1161. The court noted this option of aerial surveillance could
only be used when LFA is deployed during daylight and when weather permits to

ensure the least practicable adverse impact. Id.
123. See Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (concluding that Navy acted arbitrarily
and capriciously by failing to: (1) extend coastal exclusion zone; and (2) use aerial
surveys for close to shore LFA missions).
124. For a discussion of the court's analysis in Evans, see supra notes 87-125
and accompanying text.
125. See Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (summarizing holding which resulted

in balancing of both parties' interests).
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activities. 12 6 The decision is troubling, however, due to the detrimental effects it may have on the Navy's ability to maintain combat
127
preparedness and to ensure national security.
The court properly identified the requirements for compliance
under the MMPA. 128 Because it falls under the umbrella as a federal agency, the Navy, like all other agencies, is required to comply
129
with the substantive and procedural requirements of the MMPA.
The Evans court followed existing Ninth Circuit precedent in determining the appropriate definition of "harassment" within the
MMPA. 13 0 Like other cases addressing the "harassment" criteria,
the Evans court affirmed the requirement for a potentially significant behavioral change or response in a biologically important behavior or activity.1 31 As the Navy had correctly identified in the
Final Rule, "harassment" requires more than a temporary, non-inju132
rious alteration of marine mammal behavior.
Unlike the temporary or minor interruptions of wildlife behavior noted by the court in Tepley, the Evans court recognized that
employing low-frequency sonar could potentially cause serious disruptions of marine mammals' customary habits.' 3 3 As such, the
court in Evans readily determined that the steps taken by the Navy
were insufficient to ensure that potential disruptions would not sig34
nificantly impact marine wildlife activity.'
126. For a discussion of the court's consistency with existing precedent regarding MMPA interpretation in Evans, see infra notes 131-36 and accompanying
text.
127. For a discussion regarding the detrimental effects the Evans decision
may produce, see infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of the court's MMPA analysis in Evans, see supra notes
87-125 and accompanying text.
129. See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 599-601 (D. Mass. 1995) (discussing and applying MMPA).
130. See Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-58 (discussing "harassment" under
MMPA); see also Strahan, 967 F. Supp. at 599-602 (discussing "harassment" under
MMPA); see also Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 1284 (holding no violation of MMPA because
there was no sustained disruption of marine mammals' routine).
131. See Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (recognizing that NMFS' paraphrasing
of "disruption of behavior patterns" to "a significant behavioral change in a biologically important behavior or activity" was allowed). See also Hayashi,5 F.3d at 128283 (discussing requirement that there be potential for significant behavioral
change or response in biologically important behavior or activity).
132. For a discussion of the Navy's proposed definition of "harassment" in the
Final Rule, see supra notes 106-07 and accompanying discussion.
133. See Tepley v. Nat'l. Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 908 F. Supp. 708, 713
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting insufficient evidence of "substantial disruption" of
wildlife).
134. For a discussion of the district court's analysis regarding the sufficiency
of the Navy's attempts to reduce environmental disruptions, see supranotes 87-122
and accompanying text.
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In addition, the court's findings, that the Navy's Final Rule was
insufficient under the MMPA's negligible impact and mitigation
and monitoring requirements, reflect earlier courts' strict interpretation of Congress' intentions to control the safety of marine mammal wildlife under the MMPA.13 5 Like other Ninth Circuit cases
where the MMPA's negligible impact and mitigation and monitoring requirements have been discussed, the Evans court stressed that
omissions in these areas, including the Navy's failure to extend the
exclusion zone and failure to use aerial observation for LFA sonar
missions operated close to shore, were "arbitrary and capricious
136
acts."
Despite the Northern District of California's adherence to precedent and appropriate interpretation of the MMPA, its decision is
problematic given the Navy's need to maintain effective national
defense measures, particularly in light of the increasing threat level
to national security today.1v? Even though the Navy has already
made a substantial effort in assessing marine mammal impacts, developing mitigation efforts that will satisfy the MMPA is increasingly
difficult and often results in significant impacts on naval readiness.13 8 One commentator observed that meeting the requirements of the MMPA can be an expensive and time-consuming
13 9
process.
As evidenced by the court's decision in Evans, carrying out military operations, while maintaining compliance with environmental
legislation like the MMPA, may not be possible without severely limiting the extent and circumstances of the operations. 140 As a result
of constraints upon naval training and military readiness due to leg135. See generally Tepley, 908 F. Supp. at 708 (discussing MMPA interpretation).
136. SeeEvans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. For a discussion of the court's mitigation and monitoring analysis in Evans, see supra notes 117-25 and accompanying
text.
137. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 480 (noting that current jurisprudence results in problems regarding MMPA compliance). The author states that "[t]he
Navy's current antisubmarine skills are the result of decades of realistic and rigorous training, and antisubmarine sonar proficiency is difficult to regain after loss
through atrophy." Id.
138. See id. at 484 (discussing difficulties in compliance measures required
under MMPA).
139. Id. at 485 (noting that parties resistant to Navy's use of sonar could easily
resort to lack of clarity in MMPA's definition of "harassment" to preclude such

operations).
140. See id. at 487 (discussing possible ways to maintain effective balance between military preparedness and environmental protection). But see McClure,
supra note 37 (quoting Rear Adm. Robert Moeller: "[the Navy] must conduct comprehensive and realistic combat training.").
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islation like the MMPA, avenues of potential redress are under
review.

14 1

As a short-term course of action, the Department of the Navy
should continue to work with the Departments of Commerce and
the Interior to make reasonable proposals for legislative changes to
the MMPA. 14 2 Specifically, the agencies should address the overly
broad definition of "harassment" under the MMPA, which allows
for only small numbers of incidental takes, and the MMPA's failure
1 43
to balance national security requirements.
In addition, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed, as an
amendment to the MMPA, the "Armed Forces Marine Mammal
Protection Act.' 44 The intention behind this amendment is to harmonize the need to protect marine mammals while simultaneously
maintaining military readiness within the MMPA's strict permitting
regime. 145 The proposed subsection also provides that upon request of the Secretary of Defense, the President may, for purposes
of national security, exempt armed forces operations from applica14 6
tion of the MMPA.
As a long-term course of action, commentators suggest that the
Navy consider using closed environments, such as quarries, lagoons
14 7
or catch-ponds for testing, to avoid interfering with the MMPA.
As noted above, however, the geographic and spatial requirements
141. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 488-93 (advancing potential corrective actions to ensure adequate naval sonar compliance with MMPA such as enhanced
agency cooperation and interaction, changes to definition of "harassment,"
amendment of MMPA, and exploration of alternative training methods).
142. See id. at 488-93 (discussing possible short-term courses of action to ensure adequate compliance with MMPA).
143. See id. at 489 (noting that these MMPA issues "affect readiness, compromise the national military strategy, and place sailors and marines at an unnecessary
greater degree of risk."). The author suggests that a proposed amendment to the
MMPA would clarify that "harassment" does not apply to actions resulting in insignificant changes in marine mammal behavior, thereby limiting the number of permits required under the MMPA. Id.
144. Id. at 491 (discussing proposed amendments to MMPA regarding Naval
operations).
145. See id. at 491-92. The draft proposes that 16 U.S.C. § 1383 be amended
to include a Marine Mammal Protection Procedures for the Armed Forces section
which would intend for the incidental kill, serious injury or harassment of marine
mammals during military operations to be limited to the lowest practical levels
consistent with national security requirements. Id.
146. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 492 (explaining that passage of proposed
draft will ensure protection of marine mammals while making it easier to comply
with Act by eliminating need to obtain permit under MMPA).
147. See id. at 493 (suggesting long-term courses of action to ensure naval
sonar training compliance with MMPA).
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necessary to employ a system like SURTASS LFA make it difficult to
148
effectively test in such closed environments.
Overall, it appears that it will be necessary to address Naval operations involving use of the new sonar and compliance with the
MMPA from an administrative or legislative perspective. 149 As the
Northern District of California made clear in its interpretation of
the MMPA in Evans, the Act, as it currently reads, provides minimal
150
flexibility regarding its protection of the environment.
VI.

IMPACT

As evidenced by the Northern District of California's decision
in Evans, carrying out military operations, while maintaining compliance with environmental legislation like the MMPA, may be impossible without severely limiting the extent and circumstances of
the operations.1 51 Even though the District Court sought to maintain a balance between national security and providing adequate
protection for marine wildlife, its strict application of the MMPA
will likely result in more conservative training measures when em1 52
ploying the new sonar system.
The Northern District of California, guided by existing precedent, appropriately applied the MMPA to the Navy's use of sonar in
Evans.153 Unless the existing requirements of the MMPA are clarified or modified, it appears that military operations will continue to
15 4
be restrained by the legislation as it presently exists.
As an alternative to appealing the decision of the Evans court,
those who favor a more lenient interpretation of the MMPA and its
application to military training operations may be required to re148. For a discussion of SURTASS LFA, see supranotes 31-42 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of alternative approaches to complying with the MMPA,

see supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of the court's MMPA analysis in Evans, see supra notes

87-125 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the Evans court's analysis of the MMPA, see supra
notes 87-125 and accompanying text.
152. See generally, Kiamos, supra note 1 (discussing potential adverse effects of
limitations placed on military operations due to need for compliance with MMPA).
153. For a discussion of the district court's application of the MMPA, see
supra notes 87-125 and accompanying text.
154. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 518 (suggesting that clarifying environmental
requirements will allow military operations to train more effectively while protecting human health and environment).
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sort to administrative or legislative resources.1 55 Regulatory agencies should carefully consider Department of Defense and Naval
assessments regarding the impact that restricting or modifying
training or testing will have on national defense. 15 6 Proposed
amendments to the MMPA may be one potential resolution to the
problem of balancing military readiness impacts with environmen1 57
tal impacts in light of Naval training requirements.
Carolyn M. Chopko
155. For a discussion of potential short and long-term courses of action to
ensure adequate naval sonar training compliance with the MMPA, see supra notes
142-48 and accompanying text.
156. See Kiamos, supra note 1, at 519 (suggesting remedies for problems re-

garding compliance with environmental legislation in context of military training
operations).
157. See id. (suggesting remedies for problems regarding compliance with environmental legislation in context of military training operations).
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